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KENT v. UNITED STATES AND In re GAULT:
TWO DECISIONS IN SEARCH OF A THEORY
By THOms A. WELCH*
AFTER the 60 years of operation of the juvenile courts, and after
nearly every state supreme court had specifically determined that
special juvenile court procedures were constitutionally valid under the
rationale of parens patriae, the United States Supreme Court has
handed down two decisions in the short span of 14 months that have
decreed several constitutional prerequisites of the "special" proce-
dure for juvenile justice.
Kent v. United States' dealt with implied statutory requirements
of a fair hearing upon waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in favor
of trial in the criminal courts, under the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court Act "read in the context of constitutional principles relating
to due process and the assistance of counsel."'2 The Court also, in
dicta, raised the question of whether the juvenile system of corrective
treatment performs "well enough ... to make tolerable the immun-
ity of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties appli-
cable to adults."3
In re GauLt4 presented squarely a broad range of questions going
directly to the constitutional validity of the parens patriae rationale
for lessened procedural protections in juvenile delinquency determi-
nations. There was never really time in which to speculate whether
the dicta in Kent was intended as a warning of needed statutory re-
forms. It was clear that the Court, itself, was preparing to embark
upon due process reforms.5 The only real question after Kent was
how pervasive would be the Court's first venture into the fairness of
delinquency determinations, and what dimension it would give to
"due process" and "equal protection" within the context of the spe-
cial "noncriminal" treatment of juvenile offenders.
-The Keni Case- Premise- -
The Kent case did not address itself to the question of whether
delinquency proceedings are another form of criminal prosecution,
or whether they are a distinctively different system without emphasis
*Member, San Francisco Bar.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2 Id. at 557.
3 Id. at 555.
4 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5 Certiorari was granted in Gault only 3 months after the Kent decision
was announced. 384 U.S. 997 (1966).
on criminality and the retributive and deterrent-by-example elements
of criminal laws.6 Nor did it raise the question of whether a true dif-
ference in the juvenile court system might call for the application of
different standards of "due process" from those heretofore applied in
criminal cases. Although his initial apprehension and custody prior to
the waiver determination were necessarily under the aegis of the
Juvenile Court Act, Morris Kent never actually became the subject
of a delinquency proceeding because he was surrendered to the dis-
trict court for trial under the general criminal laws of the District of
Columbia. The Supreme Court held that the Juvenile Court Act's
provision for "full investigation" before the juvenile court could
waive jurisdiction contemplated more than the summary treatment
he received. "Full investigation" meant at least a hearing before
the juvenile judge, access by the minor's counsel to the records and
reports considered by the judge in making his determination, and a
statement of reasons for the court's decisionj
The Court's holding was based upon what were termed "vitally
important statutory rights" which entitled the minor, absent waiver,
to "special rights and immunities" incident to determination and
treatment as a juvenile delinquent." Although the Court stated that
"the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an in-
vitation to procedural arbitrariness"9 and that there is concern that a
child "gets neither the protection accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children,"'1 these
statements had virtually no relation to the waiver procedure under
consideration. The juvenile court was neither prescribing treatment
nor otherwise exercising a "parental" function. However, the Kent
case, contrary to the suggestions implicit in its own dicta, did affirma-
tively hold, as the basis of the "due process" standards necessary to a
valid waiver hearing, that the "special rights and immunities" af-
forded by the Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia were
"vitally important" to Kent and, presumably, any other juvenile af-
6 It is, of course, true that no single justiciable controversy on its own
merits can pose a question of such broad compass. Whereas in Kent the Court
treated the issues before it on the basis of the governing statutes only, and
certain constitutional principles, in Gault it ranged far from Arizona law and
institutions and based its constitutional conclusions on the right to counsel and
self-incrimination, at least partly on general- indictments of juvenile court
systems throughout the nation. As Justice Harlan remarked in dissent, "The
Court does not indicate at what points and for what purposes such views, held
either by it or by other observers, might be pertinent to the present issues."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1967). For this reason the Court's decision goes
well beyond those rights actually determined in the Gault case.
7 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-63 (1966).
Id. at 556-57.
9 Id. at 555.
10 Id. at 556.
THE HASTINGS LAW JfOUIRNAL [VOL. 19
forded similar rights by any other juvenile court act. These rights
included: (1) protection from publicity; (2) provision of a special
place of confinement separate from adult offenders; (3) a limitation
on the duration of possible confinement (until majority); (4) an
announced policy preference for disposition to parental custody rather
than institutional confinement; and (5) protection against the loss of
civil rights which would normally follow from conviction for a serious
crime."
It was implicit in the Court's holding that these statutory distinc-
tions from criminal prosecution were valid and valuable rights enur-
ing to the benefit of a juvenile processed through a juvenile court
system. This foundation for the holding in Kent does relate to the
constitutional validity of a special procedure for juvenile delinquency
determinations. Moreover, it seemed to recognize a basis of constitu-
tional significance for distinguishing the procedural requirements for
juvenile delinquency determination and criminal prosecution. How-
ever, little more than a year later the Supreme Court apparently
reverted to and confirmed the doubts it had expressed as dicta in the
Kent case, thereby throwing substantial doubt on the "vital impor-
tance" of the special protections afforded by juvenile delinquency
acts.
Background of the Gault Case
In re Gault'2 presented to the Court questions concerning the con-
stitutional requirements for notice to the child and his parents of
specific charges, notice of the right to counsel and to remain silent, the
right to confrontation by the accusing witness and cross-examination,
and the right to a record of the delinquency proceedings and appeal
from an adverse determination. 3 Other issues of constitutional im-
port that were before the Arizona Supreme Court on the original
petition for habeas corpus were not included in the petition for cer-
tiorari and were not decided by the Court.' 4
Gerald Gault had been found a "delinquent child" at the age of
15 years for having participated in a "nuisance phone call" involving
the use of obscene language, punishable under the Arizona Criminal
Code by a minor fine or imprisonment for 2 months,' 5 and for being
"habitually involved in immoral matters,"' 6 relating to Gerald's ad-
mission of similar previous phone calls, a previous referral to juvenile
11 Id. at 556-57.
12 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13 Id. at 10.
14 Id. at 11 n.7. See In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 185-86, 407 P.2d 760,-,763-
64 (1965).
'5 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967).
16 Id. at 9.
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court involving a stolen baseball glove, and an outstanding probation
for involvement in the theft of a lady's purse. Gerald was committed
to the State Industrial School for the period of his minority unless
sooner discharged (up to 6 years).17
The Supreme Court of Arizona had held, on a habeas corpus peti-
tion .by Gerald's parents for custody of their son, that the non-punitive
and rehabilitative, nonadversary philosophy of the Arizona Juvenile
Code justified a procedure within the ambit of "civil due process"
that was less technical and less alienative of the juvenile than crimi-
nal proceedings. Therefore the Arizona court found: (1) that writ-
ten notice of the specific charges and a written record of the proceed-
ings were not required because they would add to the stigma of "crim-
inality"; (2) that the nonadversary climate is enhanced by designating
the probation officer rather than independent counsel to look after
the child's interests before the court, and by confronting the child
with his accuser only when the charges are denied; and (3) that in-
dividualized, rehabilitative handling of each juvenile is enhanced by "a
rule which does not require the judge to advise the infant of a privi-
lege against self-incrimination."' It is clear that the Arizona Supreme
Court considered the intent and purpose of its Juvenile Code, to "civ-
ilize" the correction of juvenile misconduct, controlling on the ele-
ments of procedural protection essential to due process.
A Different Premise in Gauli
At the outset the United States Supreme Court properly stated
the broad question before it, "to ascertain the precise impact of the
due process requirement upon such proceedings."' 9 Then it per-
formed an abrupt change of direction, comparing the "differences
[which] have been tolerated"20 from the criminal law standard of
due process with the procedural protections afforded juveniles and
adults alike under criminal law before the juvenile court systems
emerged. 21 The Court spoke of "[d]epartures from established prin-
ciples of due process"' 22 and "[f] ailure to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process" 23 without having yet addressed itself
to what is the content of due process required in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. It then concluded that "due process" was indeed appli-
cable to delinquency determinations. Thus, the Court's introductory
discussions did little to advance a determination of the "precise impact
17 Id. at 7-8.
18 In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 187-92, 407 P.2d 760, 765-68 (1965).
19 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1967).
20 Id. at 14.
21 Id. at 14-17.
22 Id. at 18.
23 Id. at 19.
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of the due process requirement upon such proceedings. '24 Rather it
undertook to discuss whether some due process requirements were
applicable, a question not really at issue,25 in a manner which as-
sumed that these "requirements" were already ascertained by refer-
ence to criminal procedure.
By this point it was apparent that the Court was not going to
undertake a fresh appraisal of the essential content of due process in
a unique form of judicial proceeding as its original statement of the
broad question before it seemed to suggest. The question the Court
had prepared itself to answer was: Which of the traditional criminal
procedure safeguards must now be applied to delinquency determina-
tions to ensure their fundamental fairness? Having approached the
question from the outset in terms of a "tolerance" of differences
from ordinary criminal procedure,26 and having also initially deter-
mined that uniquely beneficial features of the juvenile court system
are "in no way involved" 27 because they "will not be impaired by
constitutional domestication,"28 criminal procedure "norms" became
the model for what was to follow.
Of course it was central to a satisfactory answer of the question
before the Court whether the unique aspects of the juvenile court
system are themselves constitutionally significant in giving content
to the essentials of fair procedure. Reading some of them out of con-
sideration because they will not be impaired by procedural safeguards
is certainly less than forthright treatment.29 It amounts to a rejec-
tion of their constitutional significance, making them, henceforth, not
an essential part of a constitutionally valid juvenile correction system.
Such a result can only serve to further weaken adherence to the spe-
cial protective provisions of juvenile court acts, especially where a
right of appeal does not exist and correction of abuses must be ob-
tained by petition for habeas corpus.
The Resultant Theory of Juvenile Court Due Process
The Court's introductory comments in Gault made frequent ref-
erence to the questions it had raised as dicta in the Kent case about
24 Id. at 14.
25 See id. at 13, where the Court notes that "the Due Process Clause has
a role to play." The Arizona Supreme Court certainly never denied that due
process applied: "The problem is ascertaining the particular elements which
constitute due process in a juvenile hearing." In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 187,
407 P.2d 760, 765 (1965).
20 See quotation at note 20 supra.
27 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
28 Id.
29 As further discussed infra, it is also patently contrary to Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) wherein these same statutory benefits were deemed
"vitally important" and the threat of their loss was deemed "critical" and of
"tremendous consequences." Id. at 556, 554.
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the practical validity of special concern, protection and correctional
treatment for juveniles under the juvenile court system.30 Although
claiming no purpose to "denigrate the juvenile court process," 31 it once
again expressed its disbelief that special institutions for individual
corrective treatment separate from adults, the destigmatizing influ-
ence of the "delinquency" label, protection from adverse publicity
and social disability, the therapeutic influence of a nonadversary at-
mosphere in court, and the avowed preference for disposition to
parental custody, rather than institutionalization, were realized in
practice 3 2 In effect, the Court rejected the practical value and bene-
fit of the very "special rights and immunities" it had held to be "vi-
tally important" in the Kent case. Whereas in Kent it found a waiver
hearing to be "critically important" because the rights and immunities
afforded by the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act would have
saved Morris Kent from many of the adverse consequences of crimi-
nal prosecution,33 in Gault the Court concluded that the "rights and
protections" afforded by the criminal courts were substantial com-
pared to the "mere verbiage" and "clich6" of special benefits under
the juvenile court system.3 4 The contrast of these fundamentally
different premises is relieved only by the fact that Gerald Gault re-
ceived a substantially longer commitment than he could have re-
ceived under the criminal law, whereas Morris Kent would have
necessarily been exposed to a lesser period of commitment under the
Juvenile Court Act than he could and did receive as the result of
criminal conviction.
35
One cannot help but wonder how the holding of Kent and the
underlying premise of Gault can be reconciled in a case of waiver of
jurisdiction to the criminal courts in which the juvenile could be
committed for a longer period under juvenile law than under the
criminal law. Are not the special rights and immunities afforded by
treatment as a juvenile delinquent then totally a "mere verbiage" and
no longer "vitally important" to the juvenile defendant? Or is a
waiver hearing then "critically important" because the juvenile finds
his rights and immunities under the criminal law of vital impor-
tance?36 What if he could receive a maximum of 5 years incarcera-
30 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18, 30 (1967).
3' Id. at 22.
82 Id. at 22-28.
83 See text at note 11 supra.
34 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967).
35 Gerald Gault was confined for up to 6 years as opposed to a maximum
of 2 months under criminal law. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967). Morris
Kent could have been confined as a juvenile for up to 5 years as opposed to
the life imprisonment he received under criminal law. Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 554, 557 (1966).
36 Cf. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961). It has been suggested that an absolute right of waiver by the
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tion under either system of laws? Then the rights and immunities
of treatment as a juvenile are the only differences. Are they consti-
tutionally significant enough to make a waiver hearing still "critically
important"?
Although it is certainly not here suggested that the quantitative
differences in maximum possible loss of liberty is irrelevant to the
question of adequacy of procedural safeguards, it seems apparent that
the constitutional indicia for due process standards of procedure must
encompass a broader spectrum of analysis, including qualitative as-
pects of incarceration and other aspects of the system. The fact of
exposure to incarceration at all, a qualitative consideration, seems, in
light of the fourteenth amendment's specific concern for preserving
individual liberty, to be an appropriate basis for prescribing proce-
dural safeguards aimed at ensuring the reliability of determinations
that state intervention is warranted.3 7 The right to counsel, reliable
evidence, standard of proof, cross-examination, and transcript of rec-
ord all relate to reliability. Other procedural aspects of criminal
prosecution, such as probable cause for apprehension, the right to bail,
the right to trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination and
exclusionary rules for evidence obtained by trespassory searches and
seizures, should not be applied verbatim to juvenile proceedings with-
out due consideration of qualititative differences in incarceration and
other differences in juvenile law.
Rather than holding that qualitative aspects of incarceration are
"of no constitutional consequence" and that other statutory "rights
and immunities" afforded the juvenile are "in no way involved," the
cause of juvenile correction would be better served by a holding that
made these "differences" essential to the constitutionality of care-
fully tailored "noncriminal" procedures, while insisting upon the real-
ization of these differences in fact in individual cases through appro-
priate review by appeal and habeas corpus.3 8 Recent cases decided
before Gault have proceeded on the basis that the constitutional valid-
ity of juvenile delinquency determinations depends upon the non-
criminal and nonpunitive nature of special treatment.8 9 Indeed, the
Court itself recognized that habeas corpus may be available to a ju-
venile incarcerated in an institution where special treatment and
juvenile may avoid the prospect of depriving him of access to criminal due
process, although this would be contrary to the purpose of waiver procedures
and inconsistent with the philosophy of juvenile court systems. Note, 67
COLmV. L. REv. 281, 318 (1967).
87 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
88 Cf. Paulsen, Kent v. United States, the Constitutional Context of Juve-
nile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 180-81, 191-92 (1966).
89 In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 377-78, 216 A.2d 266, 269-70 (1966); State v.
Owens, 197 Kan. 217, 416 P.2d 259 (1966). See also Wilson v. Coughlin, 258
Iowa -, -, 147 N.W.2d 175, 187-88 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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guidance are not in fact provided.40 Will the quality of treatment
during incarceration be of significant "constitutional consequence"
after the Gault case?
The Inadequacy of the Resuliant Theory
The basically inconsistent conclusions regarding the significance
of specialized treatment for juvenile delinquents underlying the
Kent and Gault cases, and the consequent theory of determining pro-
cedural rights by reference to the criminal prosecution model and the
duration of maximum possible incarceration, lead to paradoxical re-
sults. Under the Court's analysis the balance of maximum possible
incarceration will weigh in favor of conformity to criminal due proc-
ess in inverse relation to the gravity of the alleged offense. That is
to say, where only a minor sentence would be possible under the crim-
inal law, as in Gault, the possibility of commitment under juvenile
law for the duration of minority appears less like special treatment
and more like excessive punishment. Conversely, where the reverse
circumstances are present, as in Kent, the balance of maximum pos-
sible incarceration weighs in favor of special treatment, under juve-
nile law. In the latter case, special statutory "rights and immunities"
clearly enhance the credibility of special concern and treatment for
juveniles, whereas in the former set of circumstances these wholly
qualitative considerations must somehow be balanced within the con-
text of juvenile law against the troublesome prospect of loss of lib-
erty for a longer period of time. The Gault decision suggests that
exposure to a quantitatively greater loss of liberty will always weight
the balance in favor of conformity with the criminal law model.
However, unlike the application of similar principles solely within the
context of the criminal law,41 the result is that the less valuable are
a juvenile's statutory rights to be "saved" from the criminal prosecu-
tion (i.e. where his delinquency is based upon conduct punishable
by incarceration for less than his minority under the criminal law),
the more readily will due process require the application of criminal
procedure "protections" to special juvenile proceedings. As else-
where indicated in the Gault decision, the criminal due process stand-
ard from which these "protections" will be borrowed on the basis of
comparative quantitative loss of liberty is .that prevailing in felony
prosecutions, even though the child's delinquent conduct would be
only a misdemeanor under the criminal law.42
A further illogic inherent in the Court's reliance upon quantitative
loss of liberty as the factor of controlling constitutional significance
40 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-23 n.30 (1967).
41 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
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in juvenile proceedings is the fact that a child's maximum exposure
to loss of liberty is a function of age at the time of a delinquency
determination. Thus, whether a child's rights under the juvenile law
are of "vital importance" in relation to the criminal law will vary, not
according to established sanctions for his conduct, but according to a
wholly fortuitous circumstance. The State of New York, among
others, has removed this fortuitous factor by imposing a limit of 3
years on juvenile commitments, 43 but the Supreme Court in Gault
noted that in most states the exposure to commitment varies upwards
from 3 years according to the child's age.44
Finally, the logic of a due process yardstick based upon maximum
loss of liberty and comparison with the criminal law model cannot be
applied to various classifications of juvenile conduct, such as "way-
wardness", "habitual truancy" and "habitually involved in immoral
matters", which find no counterpart in criminal conduct. Gerald
Gault's delinquency was based upon a determination that he had
been "habitually involved in immoral matters,' 45 even though it was
also based on a determination that he had violated a criminal mis-
demeanor. 46  Therefore, the Court's decision presumably relates to
procedures essential to both "criminal" and "noncriminal" delin-
quency.47 The Gault opinion suggests that the blanketing stigma of a
finding of delinquency might require identical procedures in "delin-
quency" determinations based upon criminal and noncriminal con-
duct. The Court noted that "delinquent" involves "only slightly less
stigma than . . . 'criminal,' "48 and its holdings as to the right to
counsel, confrontation, cross-examination and the privilege against
self-incrimination also noted the seriousness of being found "delin-
quent."49
Nevertheless, more modern juvenile court statutes have taken
steps to differentiate between "delinquents," those found to have com-
mitted acts proscribed by criminal law, and "persons in need of
supervision" who have come under the court's jurisdiction by reason
of noncriminal transgressions. 50 If a child is found to be "in need of
supervision" because of habitual truancy or general unmanageable-
43 N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 758 (McKinney 1963).
44 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37 n.60 (1967).
45 Id. at 9.
46 Id.
47 Under normal principles of habeas corpus the Court was bound to find
that either basis for Gerald's commitment could not be sustained and that he
had an absolute right to discharge from incarceration. See Heflin v. United
States, 358 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1959).
48 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
49 Id. at 36, 39.
5O E.g., N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 702 (1967).
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ness, can it truly be said this is "comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution" 51 even though the child is not subject to any liability
under the criminal laws but may be exposed to "the awesome prospect
of incarceration"? 52 What does the "awesome prospect of incarcera-
tion" demand of a juvenile court when it institutionalizes a child
under its jurisdiction over dependent and neglected children?
These questions directly relate to problems beyond those decided
in the Gault case. However, they do point up that comparative loss
of liberty is not a realistic constitutional yardstick for importing
procedural devices from the criminal law model and, therefore, the
Court's analysis in Gault is not a very useful tool for deriving proce-
dural requirements in noncriminal juvenile court determinations. A
veritable thicket of procedural questions are presented where a peti-
tion alleges a series of incidents, involving noncriminal conduct, and
seeks a determination that the child is in need of supervision because
he is "wayward" and is "habitually involved in immoral matters."
This situation presents, once again, the whole question of the state's
jurisdiction over children under the parens patriae theory, which
must be answered without reference to the criminal law procedural
model and upon a due process theory that takes account of the quali-
tative differences of substantive juvenile law from both criminal and
ordinary civil proceedings.
The Consiructive Force of Unique Due Process Siandards
It is submitted that the Court's decision in Gault has left latitude
for making such a distinctive constitutional determination in a "truly
noncriminal" context. Before such a determination is had it would
be an unwarranted disservice to the legislative reforms in progress
and the whole philosophy of nonadversary, special juvenile courts to
endow the Gault decision with greater dimensions than its specific
holdings by considering it a fundamental foundation from which
either to analogize the importation of further criminal procedural de-
vices to juvenile proceedings or to extend the safeguards deemed
essential to findings of delinquency based upon criminal conduct into
other forms of juvenile court determinations. As Justice Harlan
stated in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Gault, not all es-
sential protections can be "determined by resort to any classification
51 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
52 Id. at 36. Under N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT §§ 731-32 (McKinney 1963) only
a "delinquent" may be "confined." However, a "person in need of supervi-
sion" can be "placed" in a custodial institution for up to 18 months with the
possibility of subsequent extensions after review of the case. N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 756 (McKinney 1963). See generally Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-
Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 Mnz .
L. REv. 653, 658-59 (1966).
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of juvenile proceedings either as criminal or civil,'" 53 and the Gault
majority has otherwise "fail[ed] to provide any discernible stand-
ard for the measurement of due process in relation to juvenile pro-
ceedings."54 Despite the majority's primary reliance on the "delin-
quent" label and the criminal law model, "it would... be imprudent
* . . to build upon [juvenile court proceeding] classifications rigid
systems of procedural requirements . . . in accordance with the de-
scriptive label given to the particular proceeding." 55
If criminal law procedure importation were to proceed apace from
the Gault decision in total disregard of any constitutional effect for the
special rights and immunities of juvenile law, as Justice Harlan pre-
dicts, it seems inevitable that "rigid procedural requirements may
inadvertently ... [serve] to discourage ... efforts to find more
satisfactory solutions for the problems of juvenile crime . . . and de-
velopment of the systems of juvenile courts."56 Were the Supreme
Court to adopt standards for the measurement of juvenile court due
process which make qualitative differences in the effects of a delin-
quency determination and special treatment essential ingredients, it
would ensure a potent incentive for a more physically and function-
ally valid juvenile law system. As it is, the pressure to be very dif-
ferent from the criminal system is lessened proportionately to the
degree of "essential" procedural identity between the two systems.
The importance of constitutional pressure to be different from
criminal prosecution is illustrated by a number of recent state court
decisions that have invalidated the transfer of a juvenile delinquent
to adult correction facilities or to facilities for the rehabilitation and
reformation of youths convicted under the criminal laws, upon the
theory that procedural differences from the criminal law made special
treatment constitutionally essential.57 The illogical extension of the
principles stated in Gault, whereby the qualitative difference of ju-
venile treatment are ignored and the criminal law model controls, is
well illustrated by a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 5s
in which it was determined that insanity is a complete defense to a
delinquency allegation based upon a criminal violation requiring spe-
53 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 68 (1967).
54 Id. at 67.
55 Id. at 77.
56 Id. Professor Paulsen recognized after the Kent decision that the ap-
plication of adult criminal due process standards may not fatally disrupt
juvenile proceedings, but an improvement in staff and facilities would more
greatly benefit the children than would their application. Paulsen, supra
note 38, at 191-92. See also Ketcham, An International Report on Juvenile
Court Achievements and Deficiencies-1966, 6 J. FAm. L. 191, 203-05, 210-12
(1966); Weinstein & Goodman, A Constructive Response for Juvenile Courts,
53 A.B.A.J. 257, 260 (1967).
57 Cases cited note 39 supra.
58 In re Winburn, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 NW.2d 178 (1966).
November, 1967] KENT AND GAULT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cific criminal intent. That court decided that the abuses of the
parens patriae philosophy, recognized in dicta in the Kent case, war-
ranted a conclusion that "criminal responsibility" is a concern of ju-
venile law and its retributive and deterrent aims.59 Since the Gault
decision has at least apparently endorsed the premise upon which
the Wisconsin Court's conclusion was based, it strains the imagination
to predict what other aspects of criminal defense, born of exposure to
severe punishment and the death sentence, will be found applicable by
analogy to juvenile proceedings.
Implications of Gault's Specific Holdings
What has been said above relates to the inadequacy of the Gault
decision as a basis for determining the applicability of procedural
rights to juvenile proceedings. It is not here suggested that the Court
was wrong in the results it reached on the merits in Gault. Our con-
cern is rather with Gault as a precedent for lower courts' determina-
tions of procedural questions not actually decided in Gault, and with
the Court's apparent disavowal of any distinction of constitutional
significance between juvenile proceedings and criminal prosecutions.
Insofar as the Court held that notice, counsel, confrontation and
cross-examination are essential because they ensure the reliability of
delinquency determinations which can result in the loss of individual
liberty, its decision comports with general concepts of fairness im-
plicit in due process. So also the Court's finding that a right to re-
main silent is essential to due process where the juvenile is exposed
to criminal prosecution 6o and may be actually self-incriminated by his
own statement seems warranted by direct application of criminal due
process standards. The exposure to punitive treatment by administra-
istrative transfer to criminal correctional institutions as a direct result
of a delinquency determination, if applicable in Gerald Gault's case,61
also affords a direct basis for the Court's holding in this regard.
However, the Court's suggestion that the right to remain silent,
which has no relation to the reliability of delinquency determinations,
is required solely by the prospect of loss of liberty is not supported by
the criminal cases cited, and it is hard to believe that the Court in-
tended the vast ramifications which would follow from a literal appli-
59 Id. at 161-65, 145 N.W.2d at 182-84. In fact, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's holding was contrary to the holding of Kent, which assumed that spe-
cial treatment and immunities negativing criminal responsibility were "vitally
important" rights under the juvenile court system.
60 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51 (1967).
61 Id. at 49. The Court mentioned the possibility of transfer to a penal
institution and the threat of waiver to criminal trial as reasons for the priv-
ilege, but failed to mention whether the former applied in the case before it.
See note 6 supra.
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cation of such a rule.6 2 Similarly, the Court's statement that delin-
quency proceedings "which may lead to commitment to a state insti-
tution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege
against self-incrimination" 63 because to hold otherwise "would be to
disregard substance"64 constitutes a finding of fact that all juvenile
treatment systems are inherently punitive. But this finding relates
as much to the label of "delinquent" as it does to incarceration 65 and
should not be applied so literally as to render impossible a reformed
system of juvenile law that does not incorporate the full regalia of
the privilege as heretofore applied in criminal proceedings. Indeed,
the Court's reliance upon such a blanket indictment in announcing a
rule of general application, without any apparent "substance" in the
record before it for making a similar, specific finding as to the treat-
ment actually received by Gerald Gault, is very difficult to under-
stand.
A lengthy discussion of principles governing the taking of pre-
trial confessions was clearly unwarranted by the issues before the
Court in Gault. Only Gerald's admissions in open court were at
issue,66 and the question was whether the juvenile court judge had a
duty to ensure that Gerald knew of the privilege to remain silent be-
fore those admissions were received. Previous criminal procedure
cases have extended the privilege to pre-trial interrogation in order to
protect its courtroom significance, but those cases have little relevance
where no pre-trial statement entered into the juvenile court's deter-
mination of delinquency. The Court's reliance on the inherent un-
trustworthiness of statements made by minors seems self-defeating
to the conclusion that a privilege to remain silent is meaningful in
juvenile proceedings. If admissions by the minor are inherently un-
trustworthy, the issue would seem to be their competency as wit-
nesses, and the remedy should be the exclusion of all statements that
are not corroborated by independent evidence. Inherent untrust-
worthiness because of immaturity has little logical relevance to the
need for or applicability of the privilege to remain silent.
This unfortunate excursion into pre-trial confessions is even less
understandable in the light of the Court's reliance upon Miranda v.
Arizona.67 That case dealt with the necessity of a warning of the right
to remain silent and the presence of counsel prior to pre-trial inter-
62 Id. at 49-50. Were loss of liberty the sole criterion, a warning of the
right to remain silent, and probably the presence of counsel, would be essen-
tial in neglect an~d dependency cases where the child could be placed in a
custodial institution such as an orphanage.
63 Id. at 49.
64 Id. at 49-50.
65 See text at note 49 supra.
66 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44, 56 (1967).
67 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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rogation as soon as "freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way. " 68 The application of its reasoning to juvenile law necessarily
relates to considerations which go well beyond merely giving effect to
the "substance" of delinquency determinations in preference to the
"civil label-of-convenience." 69 The Miranda majority held that the
privilege "is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard.170 That mischief was exemplified by the fact that "our accusa-
tory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking
to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independant labors,"7' whereas an immediate warning of the right to
remain silent "may serve to make the individual more acutely aware
that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not
in the presence of persons acting solely in his interests."72 Further-
more, the Miranda case held that when an attorney advises his client
to invoke the privilege, he is merely "exercising the good professional
judgment he has been taught"73 and thereby "plays a vital role in the
administration of criminal justice under our Constitution." 74
Application of the Miranda case to juvenile proceedings raises
substantial barriers to the creative, quasi-adversary role of counsel
which proponents of the right to counsel in juvenile court almost uni-
formly envisioned.75 Is it now to be counsel's "vital role" to precon-
dition his juvenile client to a posture of unremitting resistance where
a delinquency determination and incarceration are possible? Is it
counsel's duty to his client to instill mistrust in the motives of proba-
tion officers and the objectives of the juvenile court and to proceed
upon the familiar premise of criminal defense that the system is
"seeking to punish" the child he represents? It immediately comes to
mind that the attorney's professional responsibilities to his client's
best interests become well nigh impossible to resolve in the not un-
common situation where concerned parents have, themselves, filed a
petition in juvenile court to enlist its aid in restoring control over a
habitually unmanageable child.76 Furthering the child's resistance to
68 Id. at 467.
69 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
70 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
7' Id. at 459-60.
72 Id. at 469.
73 Id. at 480.
74 Id. at 481.
75 See Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New
Family Court, 12 BUFFALO L. Rzv. 501 (1963); McMullan, The Lawyer's Role
in the Juvenile Court, 8 PrAc. LAW. 49 (1962); Handler, The Juvenile Court
and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV.
7; Treadwell, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court Dispositional Proceedings: Advo-
cate, Social Worker, or Otherwise, 16 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 109 (1965).
76 It has been recently reconmended that such direct parental access to
the juvenile courts and all "noncriminal" juvenile court jurisdiction should
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the "prosecuting" parents and court personnel, and instilling in him
a sense of impending punishment, or proceeding in an adversary man-
ner typical of criminal defense seems wholly inconsistent with a result
ultimately in the child's best interests. Since the exposure to com-
mitment in a state institution continues until disposition is resolved
by the court, the attorney may be effectively precluded from a posi-
tive, creative participation in formulating a plan of treatment re-
sponsive to the child's needs.
These ramifications of wholesale importation of the Miranda
case's rationale demonstrate that if the latter is literally applied in
juvenile proceedings, the Gault decision's premise of "criminal" treat-
ment will have become, without exception, a permanent fact of life
as a direct result of the Court's pressures to conform to the criminal
law model.7 7 Once again, were a procedure different from that pre-
scribed in Miranda constitutionally acceptable in juvenile proceed-
ings, the Court-created pressures would be in favor of reform and
toward a fuller realization in practice of the theory of special non-
criminal treatment. As Justice Cardozo said of trial by jury in Palko
v. Connecticut,78 "This too might be lost, and justice still be done."79
Proceeding from the Gault majority's general mistrust of juvenile
statements made out of court, a better rule than the Miranda model
would be the total exclusion of all pre-trial admissions by juveniles,80
thus eliminating the necessity for warnings and their undesirable
side effects. With the guaranteed presence of counsel at delinquency
hearings, a warning at that stage by the court would seem to be unnec-
essary surplusage and a voluntary confession could then be received.
If a child were permitted to tell his own story without exposure to
be eliminated. PRESIDENT'S CoM1vISSIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORcE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENcY AND YouTH
Camvm 27 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. While this is per-
haps a sound administrative reform to enhance court efficiency, these changes
would definitely further the mutation of juvenile courts into "junior criminal
courts" with consequent loss of the last vestiges of noncriminal treatment for
all juvenile transgressions. See Welch, supra note 52, at 658.
77 See In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 244, 225 A.2d 110, 121 (1966) (Weintraub,
C.J. concurring specially):
"Nor does (inadequacy in the juvenile system] suggest that we apply
wholesale to the juvenile process the constitutional rights of one suspected
or charged with crime, for we cannot deal with juvenile delinquency as if it
were a crime without giving it precisely that character."
78 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
70 Id. at 325.
80 Compare United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1967)
where a statutory limitation against detention of juvenile without a hearing
before a magistrate was considered the essential equivalent of the Miranda
procedure for criminal cases. See also Note, 67 CoLumv. L. REV. 281, 305-06
(1967) as to the importance of erecting no barriers to intake settlement be-
cause of possible referral to juvenile court.
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cross-examination, (due evidentiary weight being given to that fact) 8
or without exposure to the "all-or-nothing" rigidity of waiver stand-
ards applicable to exercise of the privilege in criminal proceedings,
and without exposure to "impeachment" by his previous juvenile rec-
ord at the delinquency determination stage, the objectives of the fifth
amendment and minimization of the atmosphere of adversary resist-
ance would be better served than by strict compliance with the crimi-
nal procedure model.
Forces are already gathering on the horizon to effect the whole-
sale importation of the exclusionary rule against "illegally" seized
evidence into juvenile proceedings. 82  The adoption of the rule for
juvenile proceedings would add nothing to the reliability of delin-
quency determinations. There is also only an approximate analogy
at best to the traditional basis for the fourth amendment right-that
"a man's home is his castle" and that privately-owned property rights
shall be secure from unqualified governmental trespass. Finally, the
requirement of criminal procedure that evidence may be sought and
taken from the physical possession and control of a person only as
incident to a valid arrest upon probable cause, would compel a funda-
mental revision of present standards for the apprehension of juveniles.
Legally and socially recognized differences between the presumed
responsibility of adults and minors compel a rule that permits the ap-
prehension of minors who may be looking for, but apparently have
not yet found, official trouble with the law. 3 Enforcement of the
liquor and narcotics laws are of special concern in the case of minors.
And what content can be given to "probable cause" for a juvenile ap-
prehension where delinquency is not based upon violation of a crimi-
nal statute but upon "waywardness" of conduct endangering "the
morals of himself or others"? The unsuitability of "traditional" rules
against search and seizure and "illegal" arrest are based upon sub-
stantive social and legal facts-of-life about the special status of minors
in our society which must be given effect in formulating appropriate
81 The TASK FORCE REPORT at 37 recommends that the judge be permitted
to draw a "reasonable inference" from a refusal to testify. The privilege as
known in the criminal law is effectively denied by permitting such an infer-
ence to be drawn. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). One must
conclude that the Task Force believed the criminal law privilege is not ap-
plicable to juvenile proceedings, and some variation of it would be proper and
permissible.
82 E.g., Urbasek v. People, 76 Ill. App. 2d 375, 383-85, 222 N.E.2d 233, 237-
38 (1966) (dictum). Compare In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 245, 225 A.2d 110, 122
(1966). See also Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A Chal-
lenge to Lawyers, 52 A.B.A.J. 923, 924 (1966) (When crime is involved "rights
should be identical, be the accused 16 or 60.").
83 Cf. TASK FORCE REPORT 25-26. A full "equal protection" equation be-
tween juveniles and adults would necessarily disregard the generally sub-
ordinate and protected status of minors. Compare Note, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv.
894, 911 (1966).
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due process standards for juvenile proceedings. Application of the
principles of Miranda in the Gault case on the theory that juvenile
law is "criminal" in substance and without recognition of any signifi-
cant differentiation from criminal law provides a convenient and
tempting basis for the application of search and seizure rules devel-
oped in the criminal law.
Hopefully, lower courts applying the Gault decision as a prece-
dent to questions beyond those actually determined therein will re-
sist such temptation, and will re-establish the judicial habit of rea-
soned determination upon the merits of the particular question pre-
sented for resolution. Even though the long-awaited decisions in the
Kent and Gault cases finally assured the fairness and reliability of
juvenile court hearings, there remains the unfulfilled nebessity for
workable constitutional principles of general application which afford
a legislative and judicial alternative to criminal treatment or the dis-
credited paternalism of the parens patriae rationale. It is unlikely that
effective reforms in juvenile law and institutions will rapidly evolve
in the face of this continuing cloud on the constitutional validity of
any special treatment system that is significantly different from the
criminal law model. The more likely result is a steadfast march
toward the egalitarian ideal of criminal justice for all.
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